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Deeming the adoption of strict tort products liability by Wyoming a
foregone conclusion, the authors Inquire into whether comparative fault
principles should be applicable to such actions. The authors find that the
arguments in favor of applying comparative principles far outweigh the
reasoning of those few courts which have rejected the concept. They conclude that the question is not so much whether comparative fault should
be applied, but rather the extent to which the plaintiff's causative
negligent conduct should affect his recovery.

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND

STRICT TORT LIABILITYA MARRIAGE OF NECESSITY
by
Greg Greenlee*
and
Ann Rochelle*
INTRODUCTION

In 1974,1 1975,2 and again in 1982,3 appeals of products
liability actions came before the Wyoming Supreme Court
which were pled and presented at the trial level on strict tort
Copyright@ 1983 by the University of Wyoming.

*Partner, Murane & Bostwick, Casper, Wyoming; J.D. 1966, University of Wyoming.
Member, Wyoming State Bar; Member of the products liability committees of the Tort
and Insurance Practice Section of the American Bar Association and of the International
Association of Insurance Counsel.
* 'Assistant Public Defender, Natrona County, Wyoming; J.D. 1981, University of Wyoming; Member, Wyoming State Bar. In addition to co-authoring this article, Ms. Rochelle
participated in 1982 in research for and preparation of a memorandum brief on this topic
for submission to the District Court of Converse County, Eighth Judicial District, Wyoming in a case which has since been tried in that court on negligence and strict liability
theories.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Connie Knowles, J.D.,
1982, Brigham Young University, during her internship with Murane & Bostwick.
1. Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1974).
2. Wells v. Jeep Corp., 532 P.2d 595 (Wyo. 1975).
3. Caldwell v. Yaa
Motor Co., Ltd., 648 P.2d 519 (Wyo. 1982).
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liability principles. 4 However, none of the appeals raised the
question of whether strict tort liability was, in fact, the law of
the State of Wyoming. In each case, the Wyoming Supreme
Court discussed certain aspects of strict liability5 but in two,
Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Company6 and Caldwell v.
Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd.,7 declined to rule that strict liability
was the law and in the third, Wells v. Jeep Corporation,8 was
silent on the question. As the Wyoming Supreme Court said in
Caldwell:
The case went to the jury on the theory of strict liability
only and thus strict liability under S 402A of the
Restatement became the law of the case even though
the question of whether or not strict liability under
4. While there are variations, alterations, and modifications, "strict tort liability" for the
purposes of this article is best exemplified by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A
(1965) which states:
S402A Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
Unless the context otherwise requires, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, is hereafter
referred to as the "Restatement" and section 402A thereof is cited without further
reference to the Restatement.
5. In Maxted and Wel, both the plaintiff's counsel and the court appeared to commingle (if
not confuse) negligence and strict liability: "The amended complaint in Counts 1 and 2
asserts a claim of negligent design and bases this claim upon both warranty in the first
count and strict liability in the second count..... Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co.,
527 P.2d at 833.
Also, in Mazted, quotations from section 402A, and comment (h) thereto concerning when
a product is in an unreasonably dangerous defective condition are followed immediately
by this quotation from a negligence section, in FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, 1 PRODUCTS
LIABILITY S 701, at 104.76 (1973): "In addition to liability for negligent construction, a
manufacturer is required to exercise ordinary care in planning or designing his product so
that it is reasonably safe for the purposes for which it is intended." 527 P.2d at 835. Wells
contains the same kind of contradictory language:
Plaintiff asserted his right to recover against Jeep Corporation and Jeep Sales
Corporation for negligence in the design and manufacture of the vehicle involved inthe accident, because of the positioning of the brake and accelerator
pedals, claiming the vehicle was not safe for its ordinary and intended use. He
asserts that Jeep Corporation and Jeep Sales Corporation are strictly liable to
him for the damages he suffered under the circumstances in this case and for a
breach of warranty. 532 P.2d at 596. (emphasis added).
6. 527 P.2d 832 (Wyo, 1974).
7. 648 P.2d 519 (Wyo. 1982).
8. 532 P.2d 595 (Wyo. 1975).
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S 402A is the law of this state is not before us for
decision. 9
Why then, if it is as yet undetermined that strict liability is
the law of this state, should an article urging application of
comparative negligence principles in strict liability actions appear in the Wyoming Section of the Land & Water Law
Review? The answer is three-fold. First, a number of Wyoming
district courts have accepted strict liability as the law in an appropriate case. Second, it appears from the Wyoming Supreme
Court's recent embrace of many sections of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts10 that what is needed for adoption of section
402A is an appeal where the plaintiff has lost a case tried in
negligence in which his well-pled section 402A cause of action
was rejected by the trial court, or where the defendant has lost
a case in which the theory was accepted. Third, even if the
Wyoming Supreme Court never has the opportunity to face
the issue, it has shown no reluctance to construe strict liability
issues"1 which in the trial court became "the law of the case."
9. 648 P.2d at 620-21. Unlike its predecessors, Caldwell does not commingle negligence and
strict liability prin les. This s not to say, of course, that certain concepts and principles
y to each theory. For instane: "The necessity of proving defecdo not ap
tiveness of the product appies no matter what theory governs the particular action:
negligence,
breach of
warranty,
strict tort
liability,5 or
other
BALEY, AMERICAN
LAW
OF PRODUCTrS
LIABILITY
1:7,any
at 19
(2d theory."
ed. 1974).HURSH AND
10. The Wyoming Supreme Court has adopted, relied upon or cited with approval numerous
sections ofand
thethe
Restatement,
especially tin(Second)
the last of
twoTorts
or three
years.are:
The more important
decisions
involved Restatem
sections
Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 193 (Wyo. 1979) (S 500, definition of reckless
disregard of safety); Kvenild v. Taylor, 594 P.2d 972, 977 (Wyo. 1979) and Basin Elec.
Power Coop. v. Howton, 603 P.2d 402 (Wyo. 1979) (J 766 and S 767, concerning interference with contract); Moore v. Kiljander, 604 P.2d 204, 206 (Wyo. 1979) (S 390,
negligent entrustment); Matter of Estate of Mora, 611 P.2d 842, 847 (Wyo. 1980) (S355,
liability of lessors); Beard v. Brown, 616 P.2d 726, 731 (Wyo. 1980) and ABC Builder's,
Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 931-33 (Wyo. 1981) (S353, undisclosed dangerous conditions known to the vendor of land; S 3, definition of "actor"; S 4, definition of "duty"; S
11, definition of "reasonably believes"; S 12, definitions of "reason to know" and "should
know"); Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167, 172 (Wyo. 1981) (S285, determining standard of
conduct and SS 286-288C, concerning the effect of legislation on the standard of conduct)
(Dubus v. Dresser Indus., 649 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1982) reaffirmed the holding in Distad v.
Cubin relative to SS286-288C); Campen v. Stone 635 P.2d 1121, 1125-26 (Wyo. 1981)
(S 909, punitive damages against a principal); Cates v. Barb, 650 P.2d 1159 (Wyo. 1982)
(SS 624-632, injurious falsehood), Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096 (Wyo. 1982) (S586,
defamation defenses; S 653, wrongful prosecution of criminal proceedings; S 656,
malicious prosecution; S 895D(3Xa), immunity).
11. Maxted, 527 P.2d at 835-36,and Wells, 532 P.2d at 597, concerned, inter alia, the duty of
a manufacturer in designing its product (discussed, as noted above, in terms of both
negligence and strict liability). Ca/dwell decided two important liability issues: first, that
post-accident remedial measures of the manufacturer are admissible in a strict liability
action since the exclusionary provisions of Rule 407 of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence
are applicable to negligence, not strict liability; second, that evidence of an absence of
prior similar accidents is admissible, just as the existence of prior similar accidents would
be admissible, as bearing on the issue of whether the product was defective. 648 P.2d at
525-27.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1983

3

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 18 [1983], Iss. 2, Art. 8

646

LAND & WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVIII

One of the most important and difficult of those issues, and one
which will arise in a great number, if not the majority, of strict
liability cases, is how and to what extent a plaintiffs conduct
will affect his recovery.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

While it is not within the scope of this article to chronicle
the checkered, though relatively short, history of strict tort
liability, a summary is necessary to an understanding of the
proposals here presented. 12 Before strict liability became
generally accepted,"3 a plaintiff injured by an allegedly defective product had the burden of proving that the often huge,
well-financed, well-defended and usually distant defendant
failed to act as a reasonable manufacturer 4 would have acted
under the circumstances-that is, that the manufacturer was
negligent. If the plaintiff sued in breach of implied warranty,
then he had even more hurdles to clear, notice to the defendant
of the defect and privity with the defendant chief among
them. 1 5
12. Should the reader desire to delve more deeply into the history and development of the
doctrine, his attention is called to PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS SS 96-98(4th ed. 1971); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (StrictLiability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (StrictLiability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REV. 791 (1966); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability,32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965); and two cases from the jurisdiction perhaps most
responsible for the genesis and evolution of the doctrine, Daly v. General Motors Corp.,
20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
13. By judicial decision or by statute, 45 states plus the District of Columbia have adopted
section 402A or a variation thereof. The five remaining states are Massachusetts, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia and Wyoming. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.
Inc., 336 So. 2d 80, 87 (Fla. 1976); 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, ch. 3[2], at 3-8;
Carestia, The Interaction of Comparative Negligence and Strict Products
Liability-Where Are We? 47 INS. CoUNs. J. 53, 63 (1980); Note, The Merger of ComparativeFaultPrincipleswith Strict Liability in Utah: Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,
1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 964.
14. Strict liability is generally applied to wholesalers, retailers and other middlemen, in addition to manufacturers. However, such "sellers" usually have rights of indemnity against
the creator of the defective product. See 3A FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 5,
5 44.02[3], at 15-20 to 15-39 (1982). This article variously refers to such parties as the
"manufacturer," "seller," or "defendant," as best suits the context.
15. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1962). By adoption of Wyo. STAT. S 34-21-232 (1977), Wyoming has eliminated privity
restrictions in breach of implied warranty actions. Pursuant to the decision in Murphy v.
Petrolane-Wyo. Gas Serv., 468 P.2d 969, 974 (Wyo. 1970), Wyoming may have also
eliminated the notice requirement, at least in personal injury cases. But see, Western
Equip. v. Sheridan Iron Works, 605 P.2d 806 (Wyo. 1980). A trial judge in Wyoming has
suggested that with the absence of notice and privity requirements, a breach of implied
warranty action is identical to strict liability and a plaintiff is not entitled to rely upon
to is the Honorable Kenneth Harm, Fourth Judicial
both
theories.
judge referred
District,
State The
of Wyoming
who so held
in Roberts v. Sweetwater County School Dist. #2,
Civ. No. 1352, Sweetwater County, Fourth Judicial Dist., Wyo. (1977). Judge Hamn, in
Roberts, anticipated the trend toward applying comparative principles in strict liability.
See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
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The Restatement. Section 402A effectively eliminates
these roadblocks, requiring instead that the plaintiff prove only that a product was in an unreasonably dangerous 16 and
defective condition when it was sold. i7 Restatement comments
to section 402A recognize two limitations to liability which
arise out of plaintiff's conduct. Comment (h) speaks of "injury
resulting from abnormal handling," and has universally
become to be known as the "misuse defense." Where it is applicable, "the seller is not liable."' 8 Comment (n) provides the
basis for the "assumption of risk" defense, under which the
plaintiff is "barred from recovery."' 19
In 1965, when the Restatement (Second) of Torts was
published and section 402A was added, the rule barring
recovery in the presence of plaintiffs contributory negligence
was the law of the land. Taking the Restatement language
literally, conduct which does not amount to misuse or assumption of risk, even though negligent, is no defense and plaintiff
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A(1) (1965). A few jurisdictions have rejected
the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d
121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super.
599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d
893 (1975).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A(1) (1965). There may be other matters which
plaintiff must prove, e.g., the seller may deny, and place the burden of proof on the plaintiff, that it was the defendant's product involved in the accident or that the defendant is
in the "business" of selling such products. Plaintiff must also prove, of course, that the
defect was a proximate cause of the injury, and the extent and nature of his damage.
Some jurisdictions have shifted the burden to the defendant to prove the product was not
defective. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413,573 P.2d 443, 455, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A, comment h (1965). Comment (h) provides in
part:
A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and
consumption. If the injury results from abnormal handling, as where a bottled
beverage is knocked against a radiator to remove the cap, or from abnormal
preparation for use, as where too much salt is added to food, or from abnormal
consumption, as where a child eats too much candy and is made ill, the seller is
not liable.
Alleged product alteration is generally asserted as a "misuse" defense, but in addition,
the manufacturer may assert that at the time of the accident the product had undergone a
"substantial change" from the condition in which it was sold. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS

S 402A(lXb)

(1965).

19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A, comment n (1965). Comment (n) provides:
n. Contributory negligence. Since the liability with which this Section deals is
not based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to
strict liability cases (see S 524) applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff
is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover
the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On
the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly
passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as
in other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and
is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of
the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
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will recover all of his damages. Without question, this result
was the Restatement response to the then "all or nothing" approach of contributory negligence doctrines and the perceived
desirability of having the manufacturer's "deep pocket" stand
20
the loss.
It is obvious that the Restatement defenses of misuse and
assumption of risk are also "all or nothing"; however, the positions of the parties are reversed. That is, the strictly liable
defendant pays 100 percent of the plaintiff's damages, irrespective of the plaintiffs contributory negligence, whereas,
in a negligence case before comparative negligence, the plaintiff would be precluded from any recovery. Most courts that
were forerunners in the adoption of section 402A or an
equivalent theory accepted, when the question was raised, the
proposition that "mere" contributory negligence was not a bar
21
to 100 percent recovery by the plaintiff.
Emerging Problems. Soon the problem of what constituted
"assumption of risk" or "misuse" began to appear. What was
misuse to one jury might well have been mere negligence to
another. Courts, juries and writers wrestled with the varying
definitions of misuse and assumption of risk,22 and often were
unable to distinguish between those defenses and contributory
negligence:
It has been held that the doctrine of contributory
negligence does not apply in products liability cases,
whereas the doctrine of assumption of risk does....
However, the two concepts are related and, under
some circumstances, appear to be virtually
indistinguishable. 3
20. See Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 44 (Alaska 1976);
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A, comments b and c (1965).
21. Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240, 248 (1972).
22. See Sales, Assumption of the Risk and Misuse in Strict Tort Liability-Preludeto ComparativeFault, 11 TEx. TECH L. REV. 729 (1980); Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse:
An Inquiry into the EmergingDoctrine of Comparative Causation,29 MERCER L. REV.
403, 417-36 (1978); Note, Assumption of Risk and Strict ProductsLiability, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 872 (1982).
23. Stodghill v. Fiat-Allis Constr. Mach., Inc., 2 PROD. bIAB. REP. (CCH) 9395, at 22,674
(Ga. App. 1982). (citations omitted). The Wyoming Supreme Court has long stated that
assumption of risk is but a species of contributory negligence, and, since adoption of comparative negligence, a basis for apportionment of fault. Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532,
534 (Wyo. 1979).
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It was not long before the Restatement's all or nothing approach began to erode, as courts cut through the semantic and
doctrinal difficulties. The catalyst was the near explosion, at
the end of the 1960's and early 1970's, of the concept of comparative negligence. Professor Twerski reports that prior to
1969 only six states had adopted comparative negligence. 24
The original volume of Professor Schwartz' Comparative
Negligence, published in 1974, reported that by the end of
1973, "at least twenty-five states were applying comparative
negligence in one form or another to all tort actions and
Washington was ready to follow on April 1, 1974." '2 Wyoming
is one of those states.2 6 In the most recent supplement to ComparativeNegligence, Professor Schwartz reports that an additional eleven states had followed suit, bringing the total, by
27
early 1981, to thirty-seven.
Wisconsin, one of the acknowledged leaders in the adoption and development of comparative negligence, was the first
state to apply comparative negligence in strict liability
actions. 28 As is discussed below, numerous jurisdictions have
followed, to a greater or lesser degree, Wisconsin's lead.
THE UNDERLYING POLICY

Comparative negligence rightly rejects the "harsh result"
of contributory negligence2 9 and promotes the proposition that
"each wrongdoer should pay for his own fault." 30 How can we
embrace that philosophy, while in the next breath, in a strict
liability personal injury action, endorse a rule which would
either turn the injured, but only partially at fault, plaintiff
away with nothing, or reward him with 100 percent of his
damages regardless of his causative misconduct?
Dean Wade asks "Why is it desirable to transfer to the
other users of the product-all innocent-the cost of that part
24. Twerski, supra note 22, at 404 n.1.
25. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE S 1.4, at 16 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
SCHWARTZ]. To say that comparative negligence was being applied "to all tort actions" is
too sweeping. Strict liability is a tort action, but in 1973 only a few jurisdictions were applying comparative principles to that theory of tort liability.
26. 1973 Wyo SEss. LAWS Ch. 28, S 1 codified at Wyo. STAT. S 1-1-109 (1977).
27. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, S 1.4 at 5 (Supp. 1981).
28. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967).
29. Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1361 (Wyo. 1981).
30. HEFT & HEFT,COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL

supra note 25, S 1.3 at 9.
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of plaintiff's injury that is attributable to his own fault?" 31 On
the other side of the same coin, in the light of Wyoming's comparative negligence statute 32 and its supposedly salutary and
humanitarian purposes, why is it desirable to thrust upon an
injured plaintiff all of the economic cost of his injury where a
product defect was a cause of the injury but the plaintiff
"assumed the risk"? The answer to both questions is that
neither result is desirable. The "all or nothing" strict liability
defenses of misuse and assumption of risk are simply out of
step with the philosophy and purposes behind comparative
negligence, as well as with the developing law.
Maintaining Section 402A Objectives. While the result of
the application of traditional 402A strict liability may be full
recovery for a causally negligent plaintiff, that was not the
paramount purpose or intent of the originators of the doctrine.
It was, instead, to protect consumers, both economically and
socially, in an increasingly mechanized society. Through section 402A (and its counterparts), this result was accomplished
by relieving plaintiffs of proof of elements of negligence or implied warranty, which were often difficult or impossible to
prove .33

The application of comparative principles to strict liability
does not alter these basic goals and would not disturb the
balance in favor of the consumer. Manufacturers would continue to be held strictly liable for harm done by defective products. Plaintiffs would still need only prove the existence of a
defect and that the defect was a cause of the injury. Proof of
plaintiff's causal misconduct would remain upon the defendant. 34 The social goal of promoting the manufacture of safer
products will not be affected by the chance that a verdict may
be reduced because of the plaintiff's conduct:
31. Wade, ProductsLiability andPlaintiff'sFault-The Uniform ComparativeFault Act, 29
MERCER L. REv. 373, 379 (1978).
32. Wyo. STAT. S 1-1-109 (1977).
33. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d at 901 (1962).
34. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d at 1169 (1978). Except for that rare case
where the court summarily decides the issue, evidence concerning the plaintiffs conduct
will be identical whether the defendant must prove misuse or assumption of risk, or only
"mere" negligence. Counsel, whether for plaintiff or defendant, will surely produce all
the damning evidence which is otherwise admissible, whatever level of proof is required.
The jury will, after hearing the evidence and applying the law given them by the instructions, decide whether the defendant has carried his burden, whatever it may be. Thus,
there appears to be no judicial economy in restricting defenses to misuse or assumption of
risk.
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[A]s a practical matter a manufacturer, in a particular
case, cannot assume that the user of a defective product
upon whom an injury is visited will be blameworthy.
Doubtless, many users are free of fault, and a defect is
at least as likely as not to be exposed by an entirely innocent plaintiff who will obtain full recovery. In such
both
cases the manufacturer's incentive toward safety
35
unaffected.
wholly
is
production
and
in design
Strict liability is sometimes premised on the proposition
that because the manufacturer placed a defective product on
the market, the whole of the economic loss should be upon the
manufacturer. The manufacturer, it is argued, can absorb the
economic loss by spreading the risk of loss to the consuming
public:
The problem with this "deep pocket" rationale is that
the manufacturer may be paying for a part of the loss
which is attributable not to the product defect, but to
plaintiff's conduct. If contributory negligence is ignored
in determining the extent of plaintiffs loss, then the
future cost of the manufacturer's product will be artificially inflated and will not accurately represent the
actual risk posed by the defective product. Although individual plaintiffs may benefit from the immunity currently given for their contributory negligence, the consuming public at large may be adversely affected. If the
future cost of a product does not accurately reflect the
risk posed, then consumers may actually choose
cheaper, less safe products because the 36cost of the
manufacturer's product is artificially high.
Perhaps the most often-voiced criticism of comparing the
plaintiff's negligent conduct to the strict liability of defendant
is simply that, being different legal concepts, "apples and
oranges," so to speak, they are not comparable. For instance,
before the adoption of its new products liability statute,37 the
Colorado Court of Appeals held that
Products liability under 5 402A does not rest upon
negligence principles, but rather is premised on the con35. Id. at 1169.
36. Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 161 (3d Cir. 1979).
37. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
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cept of enterprise liability for casting a defective product into the stream of commerce.... Thus, the focus is
upon the nature of the product, and the consumer's
reasonable expectations with regard to that product,
rather than on the conduct either of the manufacturer
or of the person injured because of the product ...
What defendant proposes here is that we inject
negligence concepts into an area of liability which rests
on totally different policy considerations .... 38
These policy considerations, together with concerns for
semantic harmony, fairness, practical problems of application,
and apportionment of economic loss, have generated much
comment from both the academic community and the practicing bar.3 9

Introduction of Comparative Principles. The majority of
courts that have considered these issues have not tarried long

in their resolution. The Alaska Supreme Court in its important
decision in Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods,
Inc. 40 reasoned
38. Kinard v. Coats Co., Inc., 553 P.2d 835, 837 (Colo. 1976) (citations omitted).
39. Brewster, ComparativeNegligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AIR L. & COM. 107,
117-18 (1976); Carestia, The Interaction of ComparativeNegligence and Strict Product
Liability- Where Are We? 47 INS. CouNs. J. 53 (1980); Feinberg, The Applicability of a
ComparativeNegligence Defense in a StrictProductLiability SuitBased on Section402A
of the Restatement of Torts 2d, (Can Oil and Water Mix?), 42 INS. CouNs. J. 39 (1075);
Fleming, Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CAL. L. REV. 239,
268-71 (1976); Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting theExtent ofManufacturer'sLiability and Warranty,52 MiNN. L. REV. 627, 652-62 (1968); Levine, Strict ProductsLiability
and ComparativeNegligence:The CollisionofFaultandNo-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
337 (1977); Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence and
Assumption ofRisk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 117-19 (1972); Plant, ComparativeNegligence
and Strict Tort Liability, 40 LA. L. REV. 403 (1980); Sales, Assumption of the Risk and
Misuse in Strict Tort Liability-PreludeTo Comparative Fault,11 TEx. TECH L. REV.
729 (1980); Schwartz, Strict Liability and ComparativeNegligence, 42 TENN. L. REV.
171 (1974); Twerski, The Use andAbuse of ComparativeNegligence in ProductsLiability,
10 IND. L. REV. 797 (1977); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liabilityfor Products, 44
Miss. L. REV. 825 (1973); Walkowiak, Reconsidering Plaintiffs Fault in Product
LiabilityLitigation:The ProposedConscious DesignChoiceException, 33 VAND. L. REV.
651 (1980); Westra, Restructuring the Defenses to Strict Products Liability-An Alternative to Comparative Negligence, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 355, 376-81 (1979); Comment, Strict ProductsLiability In Utah Following Ernest W. Hahn,Inc. v. Armco Steel
Co., 1980 UTAH L. REV. 577; Note, The Merger of Comparative FaultPrinciples with
Strict Liabilityin Utah: Mulherin v. Ingersoll-RandCo., 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 964; Note,
ComparativeNegligence, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1668 (1981); Note, Timmerman v. Universal
Corrugated Box Machinery Corp.-An Exception to the Doctrine of Comparative
Negligence in Products Liability Litigation:Michigan Courts Speak Out on PublicAct
495, 1981 Det. L. Rev. 223; Note, Assumption of Risk and Strict ProductsLiability, 95
HARV. L. REV. 872 (1982); Note, ProductsLiability-Washington Refuses to Allow Comparative Negligence to Reduce a Strict Liability Award-Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 56
WASH. L. REV. 307 (1981); Note, Assumption of Risk As the Only Affirmative Defense
Available in Strict Products Liability Actions In Oregon, Baccl
v. Hyster Co., 17
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 495 (1981).
40. 555 P.2d 42, 45 (Alaska 1976).
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We find it unnecessary to conceptualize the theory
of the action which strict liability creates in order for us
to apply comparative negligence principles to strict products liability cases which result in personal injuries.
Whether the action is characterized as negligence, warranty, or in tort, the plaintiff must prove essentially the
same elements to recover. Further, most of the cases of
strict liability for defective products have recognized a
defense based on the conduct of the plaintiff, for courts
have been unwilling to disregard the plaintiffs conduct
and to interpret strict liability to mean absolute liability
even though they may have differed as to the defense
itself. The seller has not been converted into an insurer
of his product with respect to all harm generated by its
use.
The Alaska Supreme Court goes on to quote Professor
Schwartz, who stated in 1973 that
It is true that the jury might have some difficulty in
making the calculation required under comparative
negligence when defendant's responsibility is based on
strict liability. Nevertheless, this obstacle is more conceptual than practical. The jury should always be
capable, when the plaintiff has been objectively at fault,
of taking into account how much bearing that fault had
on the amount of damage suffered and of adjusting and
reducing the award accordingly. Triers of fact are apparently able to do this, and the benefits from the apapplied in all comparative
proach suggest that it 4be
1
negligence jurisdictions.
California spoke of the overriding philosophy of comparative negligence in Daly v. General Motors Corp.:42
We conclude, accordingly, that the expressed purposes which persuaded us in the first instance to adopt
strict liability in California would not be thwarted were
we to apply comparative principles. What would be
forfeit is a degree of semantic symmetry. However, in
this evolving area of tort law in which new remedies are
judicially created, and old defenses judicially merged,
impelled by strong considerations of equity and fairness
41. Id. (quoting SCHWARTZ, supra. note 25, S 12.7 at 208-09) (emphasis in SCHWARTZ).
42. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
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we seek a larger synthesis. If a more just result follows
from the expansion of comparative principles, we have
no hesitancy in seeking it, mindful always that the fundamental and underlying purpose of Li was to promote
the equitable allocation of loss among all43 parties legally
responsible in proportion to their fault.
In one of the most recent cases applying comparative fault in
strict liability, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Mulherin v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co.:
Other courts have rejected the application of comparative fault principles to strict liability claims because
culpable conduct is not at issue in strict liability, only
causation. We find this unpersuasive. There may be
semantic difficulties in comparing strict liability and
negligence, but we believe that judges and juries will
have no difficulty assigning the relative responsibility
each is to bear for a particular injury when the ultimate
issues in such comparisons are relative fault and
relative causation. The trier of fact's comparing defendant's strict liability against plaintiff's misuse is no
more anomalous than the use of plaintiffs contributory
negligence as an absolute defense to defendant's breach
of warranty, which this Court approved in Vernon v.
Lake Motors....'"
The Trend. Those jurisdictions that have opted to compare
the relative responsibilities of the product user and the product
seller are running nearly three to one over those that have rejected the concept. At this writing, at least twenty states (or
the federal courts of those states) apply comparative principles
in strict liability actions by judicial decision or by statute, in
one form or another, to one extent or another.
The courts of at least four states apply their comparative
negligence statutes in strict liability actions-Kansas,4 5
Mississippi, 46 New Jersey 47 and Wisconsin-even though the
43. The reference to "Li" is to Liv. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804,532 P.2d 1226, 1232, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), in which the California Supreme Court judicially adopted "pure"
comparative negligence.
44. 628 P.2d 1301, 1304 (Utah 1981) (citations omitted).
45. See Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 230 Kan. 368, 634 P.2d 1127
(1981).
46. See Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975).
47. See Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of N.J., 81 N.J. 548, 410 A.2d 674 (1980).
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statutes are limited to negligence actions. 48 Professor
Schwartz lists Vermont in the category of states that apply
49
their comparative negligence statutes to strict liability cases,
relying upon Carr v. Case.50 While the authors are not in
agreement with this interpretation of Carr(at least as to products liability) Vermont trial counsel advise that the state and
federal trial courts in Vermont are applying comparative
liability in products actions. Additionally, the comparative or
liability statutes of seven states-Colorado, 51 Connecproduct
ticut, 52 Idaho, 53 Michigan, 54 Minnesota, 55 Nebraska, 56 and
Washington 5 7- specifically provide that comparative prinliability cases. 58 The courts of
ciples shall apply to strict 5tort
9 California," ° Florida,6 1 Hawaii, 62
nine jurisdictions-Alaska,
67
66
6
Montana, 63 Nevada, 64 New Hampshire, Texas and Utah have judicially applied (some commentators have used the
term "merged") comparative principles in strict liability actions apart from, or without regard to, the 68specific requirements of a comparative negligence statute.
48. See Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
49. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, S 1.4 at 5 (Supp. 1981).
50. 135 Vt. 534, 380 A.2d 91 (1977).
51. CoLO. REV. STAT.SS 13-21-401 to -406 (Supp. 1981).
52. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 52-572h (1982).
53. IDAHO CODE SS 6-1401 to -1409 (Supp. 1982).
54. MICH. CoMP. LAWS S 600.2949 (1982-83).
55. MINN. STAT. ANN. S 604.01 (Supp. 1983).
56. NEB. REV. STAT. S 25-1151 (1979).
57. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. SS 4.22.005 and 4.22.015 (1981).
58. In recent years a number of states have rushed to enact products liability legislation. See
app. H, ProductLiability Legislation, in FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, sup'ra note 5. It is obvious from the language of many of these statutes that the legislatures were attempting
to lessen the impact upon industry of products liability litigation. Some of these statutes,
as noted in the text, specifically approve comparative liability. Some other statutes provide specific absolute defenses and make no reference to the applicability of comparative
fault for blameworthy conduct which does not fall within the language of the statute. See,
e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01.1-01 (Supp. 1981). Whether these new laws will in fact
serve to reduce or lessen the impact of product liability litigation, and whether the applicability of comparative principles will be affected by those laws which are silent on the
subject, remains to be seen.
59. See Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976). See
also Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979).
60. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978).
61. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
62. See Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 654 P.2d 343 (Hawaii 1982).
63. A recent Montana Supreme Court decision, Zahrte v. Sturm Ruger & Co., 661 P.2d 17
(Mont. 1983) does not alter the author's opinion as to probable adoption of comparative
principles in strict liability by the Montana Supreme Court. See Trust Corp. of Mont. v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Mont. 1981).
v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981).
andRoebuck
Surety Co.
Casualty
64.
See
65. See Aetna
Thibault
v. Sears,
& Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978).
66. See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
1981).
1301 (Utah
v. Ingersoll-Rand
Mulherin
67. See
68.
It should
be noted
that Puerto Co.,
Rico 628
and P.2d
the Virgin
Islands have also judicially applied
comparative
negligence
principles
in
strict
liability
actions.
McPhail v. Municipality of
Culebra, 598 F.2d 603(1st Cir. 1979); Murray v. FairbanksSee
Morse,
610 F.2d 149(3rd Cir.
1979).
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In addition, the comparative statutes of Arkansas, 69 Louisiana, 70 Maine, 71 New York 72 and Oregon 73 are not limited to

actions based upon negligence. They speak instead of the comparative "fault" or "responsibility" or "culpable conduct" of
the defendant. 74 Further, decisions in Illinois75 and New Mex-

ico 76 indicate the probable application of comparative principles in strict liability suits.
In all, counting those states which have in fact applied

comparative negligence principles in strict liability actions,
those which are likely to do so, and those whose comparative
negligence statutes are not on their face limited to negligence
actions, over one half of the states are included. In addition,
two model laws, the Uniform Products Liability Act 77 and the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act 78 provide that the relative
responsibilities of the parties are to be compared and damages
apportioned accordingly.
69. See ARK. STAT. ANN. SS 27-1763 to -1765 (1974). See also Bashlind Co. v. Smith, 277 Ark.
406, 643 S.W.2d 526 (1982).
70. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West 1979).
71. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, S 156 (1980).
72. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW S 1411 (McKinney 1976).
73. See ORE. REV. STAT. S 18.470 (1981). The Oregon comparative negligence statute is
typical of others of its class and has recently been construed by the Oregon Supreme
Court. In Sanford v. Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors, 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624, 627
(1981), commenting on the 1975 change from a "negligence" statute to a "fault" statute,
the Oregon Supreme Court stated:
Removal of the prior reference to negligence actions and substitution of
relative "fault" for "negligence" in the allocation of damages extended the
principle of proportional fault on both sides to fault other than negligence. As
we held in Baccelleri, this included products liability, where the defendants'
"fault" lies in putting a dangerously defective product on the market.
74. A few jurisdictions consider strict tort liability to be liability "without fault." See, e.g.,
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 899 (Pa. 1975); Smith v. Smith, 278
N.W.2d 155, 160 (S.D. 1979). The majority of courts which have considered the question,
however, have found that strict liability, while perhaps not a negligence theory (but see
infra note 91), is still based upon fault concepts. See, e.g., Trust Corp. of Mont. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. at 1095 (D. Mont. 1981); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575
P.2d at 1166 (1978); Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 634 P.2d at 1131
(1981); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d at 1302-03 (Utah 1981).
75. Skinner v. Reed Prentice Div., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1978).
76. Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
77. UNIF. PRODS. LIAB. ACT SS111-121 reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714-62,739 (1979).
78. UNIF. COMP. FAULT ACT SS 1 and 2, 12 U.L.A. 35(Supp. 1983). Section 1 provides in part:
"Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or
reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a
person to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty,
unreasonable assumption of risk ... misuse of a product for which the defendant otherwise would be liable, and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to
mitigate damages.
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Only a few jurisdictions-Georgia, 9 Ohio,80 Oklahoma, 8l
Pennsylvania,8 2 South Dakota,8 3 Rhode Island8 4 and West
Virginia 8 5-appear to reject the concept entirely. But these
jurisdictions are clearly in the minority. One noted writer
states that he is astonished at such reluctance in the face of
"the inexorable trend toward application of comparative
.86 That same
negligence to strict tort liability actions ...
writer further asserts that the application of some form of
confucomparative fault "is inevitable in resolving the current
8' 7
liability."
tort
strict
in
sion and developing crisis
THE ALTERNATIVES

Once one is "persuaded by logic, justice and fundamental
fairness" 88 that comparative principles should be applied in
strict liability actions, one must ask how the goal is to be accomplished in Wyoming. Should the courts simply extend our
comparative negligence statute to strict liability actions or
should we judicially adopt a comparative negligence scheme
apart from that statute? If there is a judicial adoption, should it
be of pure comparative negligence or, like the statute, should it
preclude recovery if the plaintiffs fault is equal to or greater
than that of the defendant? Should the scheme limit defenses
to those found in the Restatement comments, misuse and
assumption of risk, or should it include any conduct which contributes to the injury?
Statutory Extension. Wyoming's comparative negligence
statute provides in part that the negligence of the plaintiff
does not bar his recovery "if the contributory negligence was
not as great as the negligence of the person against whom
79. See Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975), on remand, Parzini
v. Center Chem. Co., 136 Ga. App. 396, 221 S.E.2d 475 (1975).
80. See Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977); Jones v.
White Motor Corp., 61 Ohio App. 2d 162, 401 N.E.2d 223 (1978).
81. See Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974). But see McNichols, The
Complexities of Oklaloma's ProportionateSeveral Liability Doctrine of Comparative
Negligence-Is ProductsLiability Next? 35 OKLA. L. REv. 195 (1982) which suggests that
the
court in Oklahoma, when again faced with the issue of whether to apply comparative
principles
in strict liability actions, may modify its earlier holdings.
82. See Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1975).
83. See Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155 (S.D. 1979).
84. See Roy v. Star Chopper Co., Inc., 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978).
85. Harris v. Karri-On Campers, Inc., 640 F.2d 65 (7th Cir. 1981).
86. Sales, supra note 22, at 768.
87. Id. at 776.
88. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d at 1172 (1978).
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recovery is sought." 89 The state of origin of this statute is
Wisconsin." ° As previously noted, Wisconsin was the first
state to permit the application of comparative negligence to
strict liability actions. Of particular importance to Wyoming is
the fact that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin did so by extending that state's comparative negligence statute to that cause of
action. The difficulty in comparing apples (the plaintiff's
negligence) with oranges (the defendant's strict liability) was
overcome by classifying strict liability as negligence per se.
Pointing out that strict liability "does not make the manufacturer or seller an insurer nor does it impose absolute
liability," 91 the Wisconsin Supreme Court said
Strict liability in tort for the sale of a defective product unreasonably dangerous to an intended user or
consumer now arises in this state by virtue of a decision
of this court. If this same liability were imposed for
violation of a statute it is difficult to perceive why we
would not consider it negligence per se for the purpose
of applying the comparative negligence statute just as
we have done so many times in other cases involving the
so-called "safety statutes." . . . Likewise, a defective

product can constitute or create an unreasonable risk of
harm to others. If this unreasonable danger is a cause, a
substantial factor, in producing the injury complained
of, it can be compared with
the causal contributory
negligence of the plaintiff. 92
Wisconsin's application of its comparative negligence
statute to strict liability is important, perhaps even critical, to
Wyoming because in construing Wyoming's comparative
negligence statute the Wyoming Supreme Court has held that
Wisconsin's judicial construction is applicable since
Where a statute that has been construed by the courts
of last resort of another state has been enacted in the
same terms by the Wyoming Legislature, the Legislature is presumed to have adopted it as a part of the
law and intended the same construction apply in thi
state.98
89. Wyo. STAT. S 1-1-109(a) (1977) (emphasis added).

90.
91.
92.
93.

Woodward v. Haney, 564 P.2d 844, 846 (Wyo. 1977).
Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d at 63 (1967).
Id., 155 N.W.2d at 64-65.
Woodward v. Haney, 564 P.2d at 845 (Wyo. 1977). See also Board of County Comm'rs v.
Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1184 (Wyo. 1981).
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It may be argued that the application of comparative
negligence to strict liability is not a construction of the comparative negligence statute but of the law of strict liability.
However, the State of Minnesota, which, like Wyoming, took
its comparative negligence statute from Wisconsin, adopted
the reasoning of the prior Wisconsin decisions:
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Dippel v. Sciano
...

adopted a cause of action for strict liability in tort

under Restatement, Torts 2d, S 402A. The Wisconsin
Supreme court further held that its comparative
negligence statute applied to such actions. In Marierv.
Memorial Rescue Service, Inc. ...

we held that our

adoption of the Wisconsin comparative negligence
statute presumed our adoption of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's interpretations of the statute up to
that point. We therefore adopt the Wisconsin rule that
the comparative negligence statute applies in actions
affirm the trial
brought on a S 402A theory, and we
94
court on its application in this case.

Kansas has extended its comparative negligence statute to
strict liability without the necessity of redefining strict liability
in the context of negligence, 95 as has New Jersey.9 While it is
difficult to determine whether Mississippi, a "pure" comparative state, has extended its statute or has judicially
liability acadopted the same scheme as the statute for9strict
7
same.
the
is
result
the
tions, in either event
Judicial Adoption. Of the nine states that have judicially
applied comparative principles in strict liability cases, 98
three-Alaska, California, and Florida-had previously
adopted comparative negligence by judicial fiat. 99 Thus, the
judicial adoption of the same scheme for strict liability was less
difficult in those states than for a court in a statutory com94. Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377,393 (Minn. 1977) (citations omitted). Since
the Busch decision, Minnesota has adopted a comparative negligence statute specifically
applicable to "acts or omissions that.., subject a person to strict tort liability." MINN.
STAT. ANN. S 604.01(la) (Supp. 1983).
95. Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 634 P.2d at 1131 (1981).
96. Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of N.J., 410 A.2d at 682 (N.J. 1980).
97. See Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d at 290 (5th Cir. 1975).
98. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
99. H. WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE-COMPARATIVE FAULT, Appendix at 421, 435 and
456 (1978).
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parative negligence state where the statute is limited to
negligence actions. Yet the courts of six comparative
negligence statute states have forged ahead with little hesitation. Rejecting the concept of extending the comparative
negligence statute "because it is confined by its terms to actions for negligence," 100 or because the "statute only applies to
the defense of contributory negligence,"''1 1 or without any
reference to the comparative negligence statute at all, the
courts of Hawaii, 0 2 Montana, 0 3 Nevada, 0 4 New
Hampshire, 0 5 Texas' 06 and Utah107 have judicially merged
comparative fault or causation into strict tort liability.
Applicable Conduct. Extension of the comparative
negligence statute to strict liability should mean that all
blameworthy conduct of the plaintiff will be considered. This is
true in Wisconsin, where the plaintiff's conduct which would
reduce his recovery is not limited to misuse or assumption of
risk; that is, any causative conduct which would serve to
reduce the plaintiff's award in a negligence case would have
the same effect in a strict liability action. 10 8
Nor would Kansas limit the defenses available in strict
liability to specific categories. Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft, 0 9 states
Albertson thus claims it is unjust to evaluate the
plaintiff's negligence when the defendant is being judged on strict liability in tort. He argues negligence cannot be compared to strict liability in tort since
negligence is based on fault and strict liability imposes
100. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d at 848 (N.H. 1978).
101. Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d at 1303 (Utah 1981).
102. Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 654 P.2d 343 (Hawaii 1982).
103. See Trust Corp. of Mont. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. at 1096 (D. Mont. 1981).
104. See Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d at 343 (9th Cir. 1981).
105. See Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d at 850 (N.H. 1978). New Hampshire (and
perhaps Texas, see General Motors Cor. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 353 (Tex. 1977))
adopted a comparative "causation' scheme. While a discussion of the concept is
beyond the scope of this article, it must be noted that there are important differences between comparative causation and comparative fault. For an excellent discussion of the
problems created when courts confuse comparative culpability or fault with comparative
causation, or knowingly adopt comparative causation, see Carestia, supra note 39.
106. See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d at 353 (Tex. 1977).
107. Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d at 1304 (Utah 1981)
108. Ladwig v. Ermanco, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 1229, 1237 (E.D. Wis. 1981); City of Franklin v.
Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973).
109. 634 P.2d 1127 (1981).
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absolute liability thereby eliminating comparison. We
reject that argument and hold strict liability in tort does
have a fault basis, therefore subjecting it to comparison
with other fault concepts. This position serves the ideal
of judicial
neutrality and will prevent a multiplicity of
suits. 110
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
affirming the federal district court in Mississippi, stated
While the issue has not been considered by the
Mississippi Supreme Court, a noted commentator has
suggested that the proper interaction between strict
liability and contributory negligence "should be apparent on reflection. It is to apply a system of comparative fault of the 'pure type 11
and
apply it to strict
1
liability as well as to negligence."
New Jersey's rule is perhaps the most restrictive in that it
would apply its comparative negligence statute only to the
112
Restatement defense of assumption of risk.
Apart from those states that have applied their comparative negligence statutes to a greater or lesser degree to
strict liability, the nine states 1 s that have judicially adopted
comparative concepts specifically for strict liability cases
generally include all blameworthy conduct. California minces
no words, extending a "full system of comparative fault to
'
strict products liability . . . because it is fair to do S0. 1114
Likewise, Alaska, New Hampshire, and Montana do not limit
the types of conduct that may be considered in the strict liability context. 11 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, reviewing the trial court's holding that Nevada
would follow California and the Daly decision, agreed that the
trial court was correct in that aspect, but reversed on the basis
that the trial court misconstrued California law.116
110. Id. at 1131.
111. Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d at 290 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting Wade, Strict
Tort Liability, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 850 (1973)).
112. Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of N.J., 410 A.2d at 682 (1980).
113. See supra notes 59-68.
114. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d at 1172 (1978).
115. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d at 43 (Alaska 1976);
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d at 848-49 (N.H. 1978); Trust Corp. of Mont. v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. at 1094-95 (D. Mont. 1981).
116. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d at 344 (9th Cir. 1981).
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Utah, on the other hand, has thus far applied comparative
negligence in strict liability actions only to the Restatement
defenses of misuse and assumption of risk. The Utah Supreme
Court, however, in Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., left the
door open for the assertion of other defenses.1 17
Texas would appear to limit comparative principles to
misuse. Rejecting the Texas comparative negligence statute as
the basis for its decision, the Texas Supreme Court held
This comparison and division of causes is not to be confused with the statutory scheme of modified comparative negligence which bars all recovery to the plaintiff if his negligence is greater than the negligence of
the parties against whom recovery is sought .... The
defense in a product liability case, where both defect
and misuse contribute to cause the damaging event, will
limit the plaintiffs recovery to that function of his
damages equal to the percentage of the cause contributed by the product defect.118
Florida would curtail the types of plaintiffs conduct which
would be compared, but is not as restrictive as the Restatement:
Contributory or comparative negligence is a
defense in a strict liability action if based upon grounds
other than the failure of the user to discover the defect
in the product or the failure of the user to guard against
the possibility of its existence. The consumer or user is
entitled to believe that the product will do the job for
which it was built. On the other hand, the consumer,
user, or bystander is required to exercise ordinary due
care. 119
REALIZING THE OBJECTIVES

Several years ago, having held that strict liability was a
theory upon which the plaintiff injured by an allegedly defec117. 628 P.2d at 1302-03.
118. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d at 352 (Tex. 1977) (citing TEx. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 2212a(1) (Vernon 1982-1983)) (citation omitted). See Signal Oil & Gas Co.
v. Universal Oil Prod., 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978).
119. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So.2d at 92 (Fla. 1976).
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tive product may rely, the Honorable Kenneth Hamm took
what at that time was a bold and (these writers suggest, prophetic) step. He held that "plaintiff's negligence should be a
permissible defense in a strict liability action." 120 Other
Wyoming courts which are disposed to adopt strict tort liability as a theory upon which plaintiffs may proceed in products
liability cases are urged to follow Judge Hamm's lead.
All Conduct Must Be Considered. Whatever means are
utilized to apply comparative concepts to strict liability, all
negligent conduct of the plaintiff that is a contributing cause of
the injury should be included. This is so because
1. Comparison of all fault is consistent with the philosophy
that each person should bear the responsibility for his
own blameworthy conduct.
2. The point at which misuse or assumption of risk end and
"mere" negligence begins (assuming they meet at all) is
difficult to define in terms that are understandable to
lawyers and judges, much less to jurors who, after all,
must determine the "quality" of the plaintiff's conduct.
3. Equally as difficult of definition and application is conduct which consists of the plaintiff's "failure to discover
the defect in the product,1 21
or to guard against the
possibility of its existence."
4. In the absence of a statute which limits products liability suits to one cause of action, most products cases are
asserted on multiple theories, including negligence and
various implied and express warranty claims, as well as
strict liability. Presenting clear instructions to the jury
in a simple negligence case for injuries caused by a
defective product is difficult enough. To do so in a
multiple theory case where the plaintiff's conduct must
be evaluated using varying criteria (reasonable man,
misuse, assumption of risk, failure to discover or guard
against defect) and then be analyzed pursuant to
divergent theories (negligence, warranty, strict liability) virtually assures a confused jury, an unjust result,
and appealable issues.
120. Roberts v. Sweetwater County School Dist. #2, Civ. No. 1352, Sweetwater County,
Fourth Judicial Dist., Wyo. (1977).
121. Quotation from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A, comment n (1965). See supra

note 19.
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To limit defenses to misuse and assumption of risk is an unwise concession to Restatement comments which were made
obsolete by the spread of comparative responsibility. Such an
approach satisfies neither the purposes of comparative fault
nor the precepts of the Restatement, and thus does an injustice
to both.
Despite the attempt of some courts to reconcile the limited
strict liability defenses of the Restatement comments with the
concept of comparative fault, the two are simply not comparable. To avoid confusion and injustice in products liability
law, what must give way are the notions that a plaintiff may
recover without regard to his causative negligence or that a
defendant seller may be free of liability despite his injuryproducing product. The concept which must prosper is that
blameworthy actors must be responsible for damage caused by
their conduct or their defective products.
Statutory Extension or JudicialAdoption? The negligence
per se solution of Wisconsin offers, perhaps, the least
troublesome means of applying comparative principles to strict
liability in Wyoming. While strict liability as negligence per se
has its supporters' 2 2 and its detractors, 12 3 it unquestionably
avoids the conceptual difficulties of comparing apples
(negligence) and oranges (strict liability) by holding that strict
liability is really an apple after all. Furthermore, should the
Supreme Court of Wyoming adopt the reasoning of
Minnesota, 124 that the borrowing state is bound by Wisconsin's
interpretation of the comparative negligence statute, including its application to strict liability, there would be little
choice in the matter.
However, there are conceptual difficulties in negligence
per se, even though the semantic ones may be avoided.
Although strict liability is a tort doctrine, and while it may be
said to involve fault concepts, it is not, in the "reasonable
man" sense, negligence. Section 402A liability applies whether
122. See, e.g., Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 MisS. L.J. 825
(1973).
123. See, e.g., Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-RethinkingSome Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 297 (1977).
124. See supra note 94.
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or not "the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product.... "125
Should the thought of classifying strict liability as a species
of negligence be unacceptable, the solution is to judicially
adopt comparative fault (or comparative "responsibility,"
"risk" or even "causation") for application to strict liability actions.126 Many states have done So.127 If the courts can adopt so
substantive a concept as strict tort liability, there seems little
to hinder the judicial adoption of comparative negligence. The
legislative adoption in Wyoming of comparative negligence
would appear to lend weight to the argument that it is public
policy that all persons should bear the responsibility for their
own acts, a concept equally applicable to negligence and strict
8
liability. 12
Modified or Pure Comparative Fault? Comparative
negligence statutes are generally classified as "pure" or
"modified." Under a pure comparative negligence statute, the
plaintiff will recover even though his negligence exceeds that
of the defendant. Under a modified plan, the plaintiff will be
precluded from any recovery if his fault exceeds a certain
percentage of the whole fault.1 29 In Wyoming, a plaintiff will
125. Quotation from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT S 402A2(a) (1965). See 8upra note 4.
126. Such an adoption should extend to any products liability cause of action other than in
negligence (to which the comparative negligence statute would apply anyway). That is,
judicial adoption of comparative fault should extend to breach of warranty cases as well
as to strict tort liability. While that proposition is beyond the scope of this article, it
should be noted that one comparative negligence text, citing Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d
725 (Wyo. 1979) states, without qualification, that "[Clomparative negligence is applicable in Wyoming in a case involving breach of warranty and negligence." WOODS,
supra note 100, S 14:16 at 109 (Supp. 1982). The authors of this article are of the opinion
that Woods' unqualified statement must be viewed in the context of the facts and
language of the Cline decision. That comparative negligence may arguably be applicable
in a warranty action, however, is important in considering the question of whether comparative negligence applies to strict liability. This article has previously noted the fact
that at least one Wyoming district court has suggested that breach of implied warranty
and strict liability are, in reality, one and the same cause of action. See supra note 15. See
also Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788 (1980).
127. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
128. It may be argued, of course, that had the Wyoming Legislature desired to extend comparative negligence to strict liability it could have done so, and since it did not, it did not
intend to do so and therefore comparative negligence does not extend to strict liability.
That argument, however, is countered by the fact that strict liability had not (and at this
writing still has not) received the blessing of the Wyoming Supreme Court. Therefore,
the Legislature could not have intended to extend comparative negligence to that theory
of tort liability. The argument also brings the retort that if the Legislature could have
referenced strict liability but did not, this is because Wisconsin, the state of origin, had
already extended its comparative negligence statute to strict liability. See SCHWARTZ,
supra note 25, S 12.1 at 196.
129. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, S 2.1.
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be precluded from recovery if his negligence is equal to or
greater than that of the person against whom he seeks
recovery. 130
Courts in states like Wisconsin, which have chosen to extend their comparative negligence statutes to strict liability,
obviously apply the same type of contributory negligence in
strict liability cases as they do in negligence actions. Similarly,
those states like California, which have judicially adopted comparative negligence, adopt the same form of comparative fault
for strict liability. However, states that have comparative
negligence statutes, but in which the courts have chosen to
judicially apply comparative fault to strict liability rather than
extend their comparative negligence statutes, are in conflict as
to whether the court-made rule will be a pure or modified form
131
of comparative fault.
For two reasons, the authors take the position that the
judicial "legislation" should be identical with the comparative
negligence statute in such states. That is, if the statute provides for modified comparative negligence, as does
Wyoming's, then the comparative fault that is to be judicially
applied to strict liability should also be of the modified form.
Similarly, if the comparative negligence statute is "pure,"
then so should be the court-imposed doctrine of comparative
fault.
The first reason for the position set out above is that the
legislature has already spoken with respect to how comparative negligence is to be applied, and the adoption of an
identical concept for strict liability would thus comply with the
stated public policy. Second, using a concept equivalent to that
applied to negligence will avoid confusion and mistake in multiple theory and multiple party cases. The Wyoming Statutes
provide that "The court may, and when requested by the party
shall: .

.

. [i]nform the jury of the consequences of its deter-

mination of the percentage of negligence," 1 32 and "[in all
130. WYo. STAT. S 1-1-109 (1977).
131. Compare Trust Corp. of Mont. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Mont.
1981); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978); General Motors Corp.
v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1979) and Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d
1301 (Utah 1981).

132. Wyo. STAT. S 1-1-109(bXiii) (1977).
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cases the court shall inform the jury of the consequences of its
verdict." 183 If Wyoming should judicially adopt pure comparative fault for strict liability, the consequences of the jury's
verdict in a multiple party case would vary between and among
the parties, and the court would have to be especially cautious
in how the jury was instructed as to those consequences.
Under the circumstances, it seems that the preferable route
would be to have identical comparative concepts apply to both
negligence and strict liability.
CONCLUSION

Although the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming has
not yet embraced strict liability, a number of district courts in
Wyoming have applied the doctrine and its ultimate adoption
by the Wyoming Supreme Court appears likely. One of the
most significant issues which will arise with respect to the application of strict liability is the effect of the plaintiff's conduct
upon his right to recover.
As adopted in 1965, section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognized in its comments only two basic
defenses relative to the conduct of the plaintiff in strict liability
actions. The plaintiff could recover all of his damages despite
his causal negligence, unless that negligence was deemed by
the jury to constitute misuse or assumption of risk. Conversely, if the plaintiff's conduct were misuse or an assumption of
risk, he would be barred from any recovery, despite the fact
that the product was defective and contributed to the accident.
At the time the Restatement (Second) of Torts was published, comparative negligence was in its infancy, at least with
respect to its adoption by significant numbers of jurisdictions.
As advocates for comparative negligence increased, questions
concerning the fairness of the restricted defenses to strict
liability were raised. Comparative principles began to be applied. At this writing, there are at least twenty states which
apply comparative concepts in strict liability actions.
133. Wyo. STAT. S 1-1-114 (1977).
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The methods and means of application of comparative
principles to strict liability are many and varied. Some states
extend their comparative negligence statutes to strict liability,
while others have judicially adopted a comparative fault or
comparative causation scheme. Some states have judicially applied pure comparative fault in strict liability where the comparative negligence statutes are a modified form. Some
jurisdictions limit defenses to those found in the Restatement
comments (misuse and assumption of risk), some include all
negligent conduct of the plaintiff except his failure to discover
or guard against a defect, while still others permit the consideration of any blameworthy conduct which would serve, in a
negligence case, to reduce plaintiff's recovery.
The authors of this article believe that the defenses which
may be considered should not be restricted. To present varying
and conflicting theories and ideas to the jury for application to
different concepts or defendants promotes confusion and invites error.
The least troublesome method by which Wyoming could
apply comparative concepts to strict liability would be to extend its comparative negligence statute to strict liability by
considering strict liability to be negligence per se. Alternatively, there appears to be no statutory, common law, or other impediment to the judicial adoption of comparative principles for
application in strict liability actions.
13 4
The Wyoming Supreme Court said in Barnette v. Doyle
that the bar of contributory negligence produced a harsh
result, which was relieved by the adoption of comparative
negligence. It must be recognized that the application of the
Restatement "all or nothing" defenses to strict liability is
equally harsh to both plaintiffs and defendants, and is likewise
in need of relief.

The foregoing goals, we think, will not be frustrated
by the adoption of comparative principles. Plaintiffs will
continue to be relieved of proving that the manufacturer or distributor was negligent in the production,
134. 622 P.2d at 1361.
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design, or dissemination of the article in question.
Defendant's liability for injuries caused by a defective
product remains strict. The principle of protecting the
defenseless is likewise preserved, for plaintiffs
recovery will be reduced only to the extent that his own
lack of reasonable care contributed to his injury. The
cost of compenstaing the victim of a defective product,
albeit proportionately reduced, remains on defendant
manufacturer, and will, through him, be "spread among
society." However, we do not permit plaintiff's own
conduct relative to the product to escape unexamined,
and as to that share of plaintiffs damages which flows
reason of policy why it
from his own fault we discern no
should ... be borne by others.135
Surely the union of comparative fault and strict liability is a
marriage of necessity.

135. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d at 1168-69 (1978) (emphasis in original).
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